The SEC’s Short-Sale Experiment: Evidence on Causal Channels and Reassessment of Indirect Effects

Bernard S. Black (), Hemang Desai (), Katherine Litvak (), Woongsun Yoo () and Jeff Yu
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Bernard S. Black: Pritzker School of Law, Northwestern University, Chicago, Illinois 60611; Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208
Hemang Desai: Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas 75275
Katherine Litvak: Pritzker School of Law, Northwestern University, Chicago, Illinois 60611
Woongsun Yoo: College of Business Administration, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, Michigan 48859

Management Science, 2024, vol. 70, issue 8, 5131-5156

Abstract: During 2005–2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission conducted a randomized trial in which it removed short-sale restrictions from one third of the Russell 3000 firms. Early studies found modest market microstructure effects of removing the restrictions but no effect on short interest, stock returns, volatility, or price efficiency. More recently, many studies have attributed a wide range of indirect outcomes to this experiment, mostly without assessing the causal channels for those outcomes. We examine the three most often cited causal channels for these indirect effects: short interest, returns, and managerial fear. We find no evidence to support these channels. We then reexamine the principal findings in four recent studies using a sample that closely matches the actual experiment and a common research design and find minimal support for the reported indirect effects. Our findings highlight the importance of confirming a causal channel or an economic mechanism and show that sample selection and specification choices can produce statistical significance even without an underlying economic mechanism.

Keywords: natural experiments; Regulation SHO; causal channels; specification choice; indirect effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:70:y:2024:i:8:p:5131-5156

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