Antisocial Responses to the “Coal to Gas” Regulation: An Unintended Consequence of a Residential Energy Policy

Jing Cao (), Tracy Xiao Liu (), Rong Ma () and Ang Sun ()
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Jing Cao: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University National Center for Economic Research, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
Tracy Xiao Liu: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University National Center for Economic Research, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
Rong Ma: College of Economics and Management, China Agricultural University, Beijing 100083, China
Ang Sun: School of Finance and China Financial Policy Research Center, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China

Management Science, 2025, vol. 71, issue 10, 8698-8726

Abstract: Policies geared toward environmental and economic improvement could unexpectedly lead to negative consequences in other dimensions. Such cases raise a red flag to economists and policymakers who aim to deliver comprehensive and sensible policy evaluations. This article investigates antisocial behaviors in response to the Clean Winter Heating Policy (CWHP), which seeks to improve outdoor air quality. Our results show that participating villagers are more likely to violate laws to burn agricultural waste and exhibit lower prosociality in incentivized dictator games and public goods games. We further explore treatment heterogeneities and find that two channels are likely to play a part. First, the CWHP was perceived as a negative income shock. Therefore, the villagers would want to reduce their expenditure on straw disposal and behave less generously in the incentivized games. Second, the CWHP could trigger discontent and directly affect social preference. Additional evidence suggests that the antisocial (less prosocial) responses could have been avoided by granting larger upfront subsidies.

Keywords: prosociality; environmental policy; quasi-natural experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:71:y:2025:i:10:p:8698-8726

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