Politically Affiliated Analysts

Dongmin Kong (), Chen Lin (), Shasha Liu () and Yuhai Xuan ()
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Dongmin Kong: School of Finance, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China; and School of Economics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China
Chen Lin: Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong
Shasha Liu: School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China
Yuhai Xuan: The Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, California 92697

Management Science, 2025, vol. 71, issue 2, 1074-1101

Abstract: Government ownership of financial intermediaries is pervasive around the world. In this study, we examine the impact of common government ownership between the brokerage and listed firms on the information production role of brokerage firms. We show that affiliated analysts tend to issue more optimistic recommendations for stocks of firms controlled by the same government entity that controls their brokerage firms. This optimistic bias is particularly pronounced during periods of economic shocks. Our study demonstrates this by utilizing additional tariff impositions and tariff exemptions during the U.S.–China trade war as exogenous negative and positive shocks, respectively. Additionally, our study indicates that stocks recommended by politically affiliated analysts tend to underperform those recommended by independent analysts, implying that the optimism stems from conflicts of interest rather than superior information. Furthermore, our research highlights that sophisticated investors perceive the potential bias and incorporate it into their trading. Consistent with an exchange of favors story, politically affiliated brokerage firms receive a larger allocation during the issuance of local government debt, whereas governments subscribe for more shares during seasoned equity offerings by these affiliated brokerage firms.

Keywords: information production; stock analyst; state ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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