Dueling Contests and Platform’s Coordinating Role

Konstantinos I. Stouras (), Sanjiv Erat () and Kenneth C. Lichtendahl ()
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Konstantinos I. Stouras: Michael Smurfit School of Business, University College Dublin, Dublin A94 XF34, Ireland
Sanjiv Erat: Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093
Kenneth C. Lichtendahl: Google, Mountain View, California 94043

Management Science, 2025, vol. 71, issue 2, 1488-1503

Abstract: Crowdsourcing platforms typically take a passive approach, and they let the competing firms freely design their own contests and allow every solver to self-select and join any of the concurrently running contests. In a model of competing noise-driven contests, we show that the duopoly prize allocation has fewer (but larger) prizes compared with a monopolist contest designer. We also find that contests with firm-chosen budgets and solvers’ endogenous participation create coordination inefficiencies. Thus, platform policies that constrain the competing firms from freely choosing their budgets and offer solvers non-enforceable recommendations toward specific noise-driven contests strictly enhance total welfare. Extending our framework to include arbitrarily correlated ability-driven contests, we highlight the critical role of inter-contest dependence on the efficacy of a platform’s interventions. Specifically, platform nudges to improve solver-contest (mis)matches are welfare enhancing only when the contests are sufficiently related, and allowing solvers to self-sort is appropriate otherwise.

Keywords: crowdsourcing; nudges; incentives; multiple contests; endogenous participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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