Endogenous Risk Exposure and Systemic Instability

Chong Shu ()
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Chong Shu: Department of Finance, David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112

Management Science, 2025, vol. 71, issue 7, 5511-5528

Abstract: Most research on systemic stability assumes an economy where banks are subject to exogenous shocks. However, in practice, banks choose their exposure to risk. I show that there exists a network risk-taking externality: the risk exposure choices made by connected banks are strategically complementary. Banks within financial networks, especially densely connected ones, become endogenously exposed to excessive risks. The theory offers several novel perspectives on policy debates. For instance, it suggests that limiting government bailouts to interbank exposures can effectively reduce endogenous systemic risk.

Keywords: systemic risks; financial networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:71:y:2025:i:7:p:5511-5528

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