Information Disclosure and Competitive Dynamics: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry

Jennifer Kao ()
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Jennifer Kao: University of California Los Angeles, Anderson School of Management, Los Angeles, California 90095

Management Science, 2025, vol. 71, issue 7, 5948-5970

Abstract: This paper studies how competitive dynamics shape innovative firms’ voluntary disclosure of product quality information. Our empirical context is the pharmaceutical industry, where firms must decide whether to disclose private drug quality information acquired in clinical trials. Using a difference-in-difference strategy, we show that the approval of a competitor’s drug lowers the likelihood of a firm reporting its clinical trial results by 13%. We explore how these effects vary based on the project quality, competitor type, and firm experience. These findings suggest that strategic considerations play a role in firms’ disclosure decisions; in response to a competitor’s drug approval, firms may selectively withhold information to maintain and improve their competitive position.

Keywords: strategy; market structure; market performance; information disclosure; innovation; healthcare markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:71:y:2025:i:7:p:5948-5970

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