Self-Regulation for Reputation-Sensitive Buyers: SA8000 in China

Greg Distelhorst (), Judith C. Stroehle () and Duanyi Yang ()
Additional contact information
Greg Distelhorst: Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources and Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 2E8, Canada
Judith C. Stroehle: University of St. Gallen, CH-9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland
Duanyi Yang: School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853

Management Science, 2025, vol. 71, issue 8, 6925-6942

Abstract: Industries and firms have diverse motives for adopting self-regulatory institutions. This research develops and tests propositions about one motive—exploiting opportunities to do business with reputation-sensitive buyers—as distinct from self-regulation to defend against regulatory or activist threats. To study the adoption and effects of self-regulation for reputation-sensitive buyers, we study the SA8000 socially responsible employment certification among large firms in China in the early 2000s. Using official longitudinal industrial microdata, we test hypotheses generated by this assumed motive for self-regulation and find that (a) despite concerns about the corruptibility of certification bodies, SA8000 adopters in China exhibited higher precertification worker wages than comparable nonadopters, (b) self-regulation led to increased employment and sales to foreign markets, where reputation-sensitive buyers are concentrated, (c) the positive effect on exports was greater than the (insignificant, negatively signed) effect on domestic sales, and (d) there is no evidence that self-regulation increased worker wages beyond the initial high start. Contrasting these findings with prior research on industry self-regulation for other motives, this study highlights how both adoption patterns and downstream effects differ according to the audience for self-regulation.

Keywords: self-regulation; social responsibility; labor; global supply chains; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.01306 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:71:y:2025:i:8:p:6925-6942

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().