Noncooperative Games for Subcontracting Operations

George L. Vairaktarakis ()
Additional contact information
George L. Vairaktarakis: Department of Operations, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 44106

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2013, vol. 15, issue 1, 148-158

Abstract: Consider a set of manufacturers, all of which can subcontract part of their workload to a third party. For simplicity, we assume that every manufacturer as well as the third party each possess a single production facility. Each manufacturer has to decide the amount of workload to be subcontracted so as to minimize the completion time of his in-house and subcontracted workloads. In an effort to provide good service to all, the third party gives priority to manufacturers whose subcontracted workload is small. This incentive scheme forces manufacturers to compete for position in the third-party processing sequence. We develop pure Nash equilibria schedules under three distinct protocols for production.

Keywords: operations strategy; production planning and scheduling; supply chain management; incentives and contracting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/msom.1120.0410 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:15:y:2013:i:1:p:148-158

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().