The Implications of Strategic Inventory for Short-Term vs. Long-Term Supply Contracts in Nonexclusive Reselling Environments

Abhishek Roy, Stephen M. Gilbert () and Guoming Lai ()
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Stephen M. Gilbert: Department of Information, Risk, and Operations Management, McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712
Guoming Lai: Department of Information, Risk, and Operations Management, McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2022, vol. 24, issue 5, 2629-2647

Abstract: Problem definition : Although it is well known that a reseller’s ability to hold strategic inventory under a short-term supply contract can potentially benefit both the reseller and a supplier, existing research on strategic inventory focuses almost exclusively on exclusive reselling environments. However, in practice, multiple suppliers often sell to the same nonexclusive reseller, and it is not uncommon for suppliers to ask for future commitments to order quantities from resellers in return for their own commitment to wholesale prices. We investigate how the possibility of strategic inventory influences competing suppliers’ choices between short-term transactional and long-term commitment contracts to a nonexclusive reseller. Methodology/results : Using a game-theoretic model, we consider the interactions between two partially substitutable suppliers and a single, nonexclusive reseller over a two-period horizon in which demand is deterministic. We demonstrate that in nonexclusive reselling environments, where more than one supplier sells its product through the same reseller, the use of strategic inventory under short-term contracts intensifies the price competition between suppliers. We show how this effect can be mitigated when one or both suppliers offer a long-term contract. Moreover, we show that long-term contracts can arise as an equilibrium outcome, particularly when products are more substitutable or holding costs are large. Managerial implications : By considering the interactions between two partially substitutable suppliers and a nonexclusive reseller in a multiperiod setting, we contribute to the literature on strategic contracting and long versus short-term contracts. Our research provides managers with a new explanation, beyond the need to encourage idiosyncratic investments or eliminate the possibility of hold-up, for why long-term contracts may benefit suppliers in practice, who face competition while selling through a nonexclusive reseller.

Keywords: strategic inventory; game theory; incentives and contracting; supply chain management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:24:y:2022:i:5:p:2629-2647

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