EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Minimum Earnings Regulation and the Stability of Marketplaces

Arash Asadpour (), Ilan Lobel () and Garrett van Ryzin ()
Additional contact information
Arash Asadpour: Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of New York, New York, New York 10010
Ilan Lobel: New York University Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, New York 10012
Garrett van Ryzin: Supply Chain Optimization Technologies, Amazon, New York, New York 10001

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023, vol. 25, issue 1, 254-265

Abstract: Problem definition : New York City and Seattle recently enacted minimum earnings regulations for ride-hailing providers that are based on their utilization rates. The regulations are intended to deliver minimum earnings while preserving the flexibility of the independent contractor model of work. Academic/practical relevance : This kind of regulation has the potential to impact marketplace stability, which we define as the ability of platforms to keep wages bounded while maintaining the current flexible (free-entry) work model. Methodology : We build a theoretical model to study the marketplace implications of this kind of regulation and identify precise conditions under which a utilization-based minimum earnings rule causes marketplace instability. We then calibrate our model using publicly available data, showing the extent to which the law can (or cannot) increase earnings while preserving both worker flexibility and marketplace stability. Results : For reasonable ranges of supply and demand elasticity, the law’s ability to increase earnings while maintaining the free-entry work model is quite limited, and even when earnings increases are achievable, they cause significant increases in driver idleness. Managerial implications : Given the law’s potential to cause instability, affected ride-hailing companies may need to respond to the law by reducing driver flexibility to limit supply.

Keywords: transportation; service operations; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1150 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:25:y:2023:i:1:p:254-265

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:25:y:2023:i:1:p:254-265