The Design of Optimal Pay-as-Bid Procurement Mechanisms

Je-ok Choi (), Daniela Saban () and Gabriel Weintraub ()
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Je-ok Choi: Institute for Computational and Mathematical Engineering, Stanford School of Engineering, Stanford, California 94305
Daniela Saban: Operations, Information & Technology, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, California 94305
Gabriel Weintraub: Operations, Information & Technology, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, California 94305

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023, vol. 25, issue 2, 613-630

Abstract: Problem definition : We consider the mechanism design problem of finding an optimal pay-as-bid mechanism in which a platform chooses an assortment of suppliers to balance the tradeoff between two objectives: providing enough variety to accommodate heterogeneous buyers, yet at low prices. Academic/practical relevance : Modern buying channels, including e-commerce and public procurement, often consist of a platform that mediates transactions. Frequently, these platforms implement simple and transparent mechanisms to induce suppliers’ direct participation, which typically results in pay-as-bid (or first-price) mechanisms where suppliers set their prices. Methodology : We introduce a novel class of assortment mechanisms that we call k -soft reserves ( k -SRs): If at least k suppliers choose a price below the soft-reserve price, then only those suppliers are added to the assortment; otherwise, all the suppliers are added. Results : We show the optimality of k -SRs for a class of stylized symmetric models to derive the intuition behind these mechanisms. Then, through extensive numerical simulations, we provide evidence of the robustness of k -SRs in more general and realistic settings. Managerial implications : Our results give intuitive and simple-to-use prescriptions on how to optimize pay-as-bid assortment mechanisms in practice, with an emphasis on public procurement settings.

Keywords: mechanism design; pay-as-bid; market design; procurement; auctions; assortments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:25:y:2023:i:2:p:613-630

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