The Value of Smart Contract in Trade Finance

Xiaoyu Wang () and Fasheng Xu ()
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Xiaoyu Wang: Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri 63130
Fasheng Xu: Whitman School of Management, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York 13244

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023, vol. 25, issue 6, 2056-2073

Abstract: Problem definition : Smart contract improves the supply chain efficiency by enabling the supplier’s commitment to postshipment financing decisions, which mitigates the bank’s lending risk exposure and thereby reduces the financing cost. This paper investigates how smart contract adoption could facilitate trade finance activities and create value for supply chain firms. Academic/practical relevance : As the emerging blockchain technology could potentially reshape the trade financing landscape, understanding the impact of smart contract adoption and its interaction with trade finance activities is practically relevant and of great importance. Methodology : We develop a two-stage game-theoretic model and adopt supply chain finance theory to characterize the strategic interactions between supply chain firms in the presence of both operational risk (demand uncertainty) and financial risks (credit and liquidity risks). Results : We find that the value of smart contract depends critically on the trade finance structures, including both preshipment and postshipment financing schemes. Under the baseline trade finance model (with purchase order financing as preshipment financing and factoring as postshipment financing), smart contract alleviates the supplier’s overpricing behavior caused by commitment frictions and helps restore the supply chain efficiency. When buyer direct financing serves as an alternative preshipment financing, smart contract might discourage the retailer from offering buyer direct financing, which significantly hurts the supplier and thus reduces the supply chain profit. When invoice trading serves as the alternative postshipment financing, the supplier always chooses invoice trading over factoring because of its trading flexibility, which in turn, makes the commitment frictions ubiquitous and unresolvable (namely, commitment trap ). As a result, invoice trading could unexpectedly lead to a lower supplier’s profit. Luckily, such an adoption dilemma can be resolved by smart contract adoption in conjunction with factoring. Managerial implications : Our findings provide guidelines for and insights into when smart contract should be adopted and its interactions with different trade finance schemes. In particular, smart contract adoption does not always benefit the supply chain.

Keywords: trade finance; supply chain finance; FinTech; smart contract; purchase order financing; buyer direct financing; factoring; invoice trading (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:25:y:2023:i:6:p:2056-2073

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