Signals, Ambiguity, and Strategic Force Structure

Harvey Averch and Sorrel Wildhorn
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Harvey Averch: The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California
Sorrel Wildhorn: The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California

Operations Research, 1965, vol. 13, issue 2, 179-190

Abstract: In this paper we consider some problems that arise when a nation attempts to implement a strategy of stable deterrence over time. The problems arise when a nation's planners make strategic inferences based on an adversary's ambiguous signals of intent and action. A necessary condition for inferring an opponent's strategic objectives is good technical intelligence. We explore some alternative intelligence models and their effect on national response. It appears that even small improvements in the content and timing of intelligence information received by a nation pursuing stable deterrence would help constrain a noncooperative adversary and open new channels of communication.

Date: 1965
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:13:y:1965:i:2:p:179-190

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