Theory of Measures of Effectiveness for General-Purpose Military Forces: Part I. A Zero-Sum Payoff Appropriate for Evaluating Combat Strategies

George E. Pugh and John P. Mayberry
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George E. Pugh: Lambda Corporation, Arlington, Virginia
John P. Mayberry: Lambda Corporation, Arlington, Virginia

Operations Research, 1973, vol. 21, issue 4, 867-885

Abstract: Difficulties encountered in a number of past force-procurement studies for general-purpose forces have been traced, in large measure, to problems in defining the objectives for such forces. In this paper, we develop a rationale for selecting a specific zero-sum payoff function to compare alternative combat strategies. The development is motivated by analogy with the Nash bargaining solution for non-zero-sum two-person games [ Econometrica 21, 128–140 (1953)]. Our objectives are to relate known mathematical techniques and game-theory concepts to the problem of evaluating the effectiveness of general-purpose military forces, and thus to bridge the gap between theoreticians and practical planners. This paper is the first in a series devoted to the development of a more consistent analysis framework.

Date: 1973
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