Some Differential Games of Tactical Interest

James G. Taylor
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James G. Taylor: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California

Operations Research, 1974, vol. 22, issue 2, 304-317

Abstract: This paper applies the recent theory of differential games to the supporting-weapon-system game of H. K. Weiss, which was originally solved by heuristic means. The solution procedure is applicable to any terminal-control attrition differential game that has a pure-strategy solution. Conditions that guarantee the existence of saddle points in such games are discussed. This development motivates a new solution concept and encounters solution behavior not previously noted for differential games. Finally, the paper discusses the structure of optimal allocation policies.

Date: 1974
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