Internal Telephone Billing Rates—A Novel Application of Non-Atomic Game Theory

Louis J. Billera, David C. Heath and Joseph Raanan
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Louis J. Billera: Cornell University, Ithaca, New York
David C. Heath: Cornell University, Ithaca, New York
Joseph Raanan: Cornell University, Ithaca, New York

Operations Research, 1978, vol. 26, issue 6, 956-965

Abstract: We consider the problem of determining rates for a situation in which services are purchased in bulk but have to be paid for by a large number of small users. The desired rates must be “fair” and they must cover all costs. The problem is formulated as a non-atomic game and solved by using the value of the game. In addition to the general problem, we present a detailed actual case, together with computational methods and results.

Date: 1978
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