Optimizing Advertising Expenditures in a Dynamic Duopoly

Kenneth R. Deal
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Kenneth R. Deal: McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario

Operations Research, 1979, vol. 27, issue 4, 682-692

Abstract: The marketing problem of determining the optimal timing of advertising expenditures over a finite planning horizon in a duopoly conflict situation is portrayed as a non-zero-sum differential game. Advertising expenditures are determined which optimize multiobjective performance indices in a Nash equilibrium sense. The dynamics of the market are described by utilizing an extension of the Vidale-Wolfe model of the sales response to advertising. A numerical algorithm is used to solve the model.

Date: 1979
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