Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations

Hanif D. Sherali, Allen L. Soyster and Frederic H. Murphy
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Hanif D. Sherali: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia
Allen L. Soyster: Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania
Frederic H. Murphy: Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

Operations Research, 1983, vol. 31, issue 2, 253-276

Abstract: The supply side of an oligopolistic market supplying a homogeneous product noncooperatively is modeled. In this market, there is one leader and N followers. The followers operate under the Cournot assumption of zero conjectural variation and are accordingly called Cournot firms. The leader, called a Stackelberg firm, specifically takes into account the reaction of the Cournot firms to its output. For this situation, we study the behavior and implications of the joint Cournot reaction curve as generated by plausible economic market assumptions. In particular, we study the existence and uniqueness of a Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium. In addition, we prescribe an efficient algorithm to determine a set of equilibrating output quantities for the firms.

Keywords: 131 Stackelberg leader-follower model; 622 equilibrating fixed-points (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1983
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