Optimal Unemployment Insurance Policy

Dror Zuckerman
Additional contact information
Dror Zuckerman: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

Operations Research, 1985, vol. 33, issue 2, 263-276

Abstract: In this paper, we construct a theoretical model of unemployment insurance. Using techniques and concepts of game theory, we investigate, on one hand, the objectives and strategies of government, and on the other, those of an unemployed job seeker. Most of our results describing the job seeker's optimal strategies agree with the results found in the empirical literature in the area of unemployment insurance.

Keywords: 213 game model for unemployment insurance; 236 unemployment insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1985
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.33.2.263 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:33:y:1985:i:2:p:263-276

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Operations Research from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().