A Generalized Problem of Optimal Selection and Assignment

Mitsushi Tamaki
Additional contact information
Mitsushi Tamaki: Aichi University, Toyohashi, Aichi, Japan

Operations Research, 1986, vol. 34, issue 3, 486-493

Abstract: We consider the infinite version of the secretary problem. From an infinite stream of applicants, we are to select m choices and assign them, in order, to m positions to be filled. We receive a reward c k ( m ) for 1 ≤ k ≤ m (0 ≤ c 1 ( m ) ≤ ⋯ ≤ c m ( m ) = 1) if the best k applicants are selected and correctly ranked (i.e., the i th best applicant is assigned to the i th position for 1 ≤ i ≤ k ). We consider two versions of the problem: (i) once an applicant is selected and assigned to some position, he cannot be promoted to a better position at a later time, and (ii) previously selected applicants can be promoted. In this paper, we concentrate on the double selection problem, m = 2, and derive, for both the promotion and nonpromotion versions of the problem, the optimal strategy that maximizes the expected reward.

Keywords: 111 secretary problem; 111 optimal selection and assignment; 111 sequential sampling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1986
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.34.3.486 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:34:y:1986:i:3:p:486-493

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Operations Research from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().