Technical Note—Advertising Models, Stochastic Games and Myopic Strategies

C. A. J. M. Dirven and O. J. Vrieze
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C. A. J. M. Dirven: Catholic University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
O. J. Vrieze: Catholic University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Operations Research, 1986, vol. 34, issue 4, 645-649

Abstract: This paper analyzes dynamic advertising models. We present conditions that imply that the payoffs under myopic strategies are linear in the state variable, which represents the number of customers for each firm. These conditions, which determine a subclass of stochastic games, are satisfied by several dynamic advertising models. We give a criterion to check whether this model contains an equilibrium point within the class of myopic strategies that is also an equilibrium point with regard to all strategies.

Keywords: 236 structured equilibrium points for dynamic games; 349 state- and period-independent advertising policies; 362 stochastic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1986
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:34:y:1986:i:4:p:645-649

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