Axiomatic Characterizations of the Raiffa and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions to the Bargaining Problem

Zvi A. Livne
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Zvi A. Livne: Columbia University, New York, New York

Operations Research, 1989, vol. 37, issue 6, 972-980

Abstract: The Raiffa Solution to the Bargaining Problem, proposed in 1951, has several appealing properties, especially when viewed as a model of the negotiation process in an integrative bargaining situation. Unlike the well known solutions of Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky, the Raiffa Solution has not been characterized by a set of axioms. We present two axiomatic characterizations of the Raiffa Solution. In addition, we present a new axiomatic characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution.

Keywords: games/group decisions: axiomatic models of bargaining; bargaining and the Raiffa and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989
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