Myopic Solutions of Affine Dynamic Models

Matthew J. Sobel
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Matthew J. Sobel: State University of New York, Stony Brook, New York

Operations Research, 1990, vol. 38, issue 5, 847-853

Abstract: New sufficient conditions are presented for a dynamic process to have a myopic optimum and for a sequential game to possess a myopic equilibrium point. An optimum (or an equilibrium point) is said to be myopic if it can be specified by solving a static optimization problem (or a static Nash game). The results are applied to an aquaculture harvesting model and a dynamic oligopoly model with advertising decisions.

Keywords: dynamic programming: myopic solutions of affine dynamic models; games/group decisions: noncooperative sequential games; marketing: dynamic oligopoly with advertising decisions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
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