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Dynamic Search Games

Lyn C. Thomas and Alan R. Washburn
Additional contact information
Lyn C. Thomas: University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland
Alan R. Washburn: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California

Operations Research, 1991, vol. 39, issue 3, 415-422

Abstract: In these games the searcher has a sequence of looks in which to detect the target, while the target chooses a new cell after each look in the knowledge of what cells have been searched so far. Since time is of the essence and the searcher's speed is bounded, the target has a tendency to choose cells far away from the most recent look. A theory for such games is developed and used to approximate a game involving a dipping sonar.

Keywords: games/group decisions; gambling: active sonar search; military; antisubmarine warfare: active sonar search; search and surveillance: active sonar search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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