Computing Cournot-Nash Equilibria
Charles Kolstad and
Lars Mathiesen
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Lars Mathiesen: Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, Norway
Operations Research, 1991, vol. 39, issue 5, 739-748
Abstract:
This paper examines convergence criteria of an algorithm for the computation of Cournot-Nash economic equilibria. The method is based on formulating the equilibrium problem as that of finding a solution to a nonlinear complementarity problem, solved by sequential linearization and Lemke's algorithm. Conditions for local and global convergence are developed and the technique is applied to homogeneous, segmented and differentiated product markets.
Keywords: games/group decisions: noncooperative; differential (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:39:y:1991:i:5:p:739-748
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