A Note on Socially Optimal R&D Programs and Their Inducement

M. J. M. Posner and Dror Zuckerman
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M. J. M. Posner: University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Dror Zuckerman: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

Operations Research, 1992, vol. 40, issue 3-supplement-2, S335-S338

Abstract: This paper considers optimal public policies regarding R&D programs in a random environment. For a stochastic R&D decision model without rivalry, we investigate and derive the privately and the socially optimal policies. The study focuses on the socially optimal R&D program and its inducement by governmental incentives. The appropriate instruments that should be employed in supporting R&D projects are examined. Our proposed R&D model provides a theoretical economic justification for public intervention in support of private R&D activities. Furthermore, some of the results shed light on practical issues in designing a functional and efficient R&D project support system.

Keywords: government: subsidies for R&D programs; research and development: private and social program selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:40:y:1992:i:3-supplement-2:p:s335-s338

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