One-Attribute Sequential Assignment Match Processes in Discrete Time

Israel David and Uri Yechiali
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Israel David: Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel
Uri Yechiali: Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel

Operations Research, 1995, vol. 43, issue 5, 879-884

Abstract: We consider a sequential matching problem where M offers arrive in a random stream and are to be sequentially assigned to N waiting candidates. Each candidate, as well as each offer, is characterized by a random attribute drawn from a known discrete-valued probability distribution function. An assignment of an offer to a candidate yields a (nominal) reward R > 0 if they match, and a smaller reward r ≤ R if they do not. Future rewards are discounted at a rate 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We study several cases with various assumptions on the problem parameters and on the assignment regime and derive optimal policies that maximize the total (discounted) reward. The model is related to the problem of donor-recipient assignment in live organ transplants, studied in an earlier work.

Keywords: dynamic programming/optimal control: sequential assignment; match processes; health care: live-organ transplants (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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