Congestion Pricing and Noncooperative Games in Communication Networks

Ayalvadi Ganesh (), Koenraad Laevens () and Richard Steinberg ()
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Ayalvadi Ganesh: Microsoft Research, 7 J. J. Thompson Avenue, Cambridge CB3 0FB, United Kingdom
Koenraad Laevens: SMACS Research Group, Ghent University, Sint-Pietersnieuwstraat 41, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium
Richard Steinberg: Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1AG, United Kingdom

Operations Research, 2007, vol. 55, issue 3, 430-438

Abstract: We consider congestion pricing as a mechanism for sharing bandwidth in communication networks, and model the interaction among the users as a game. We propose a decentralized algorithm for the users that is based on the history of the price process, where user response to congestion prices is analogous to “fictitious play” in game theory, and show that this results in convergence to the unique Wardrop equilibrium. We further show that the Wardrop equilibrium coincides with the welfare-maximizing capacity allocation.

Keywords: communications; computer networks; games; noncooperative (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:55:y:2007:i:3:p:430-438

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