Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem
Jonas Sjöstrand () and
Pontus Strimling ()
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Jonas Sjöstrand: Department of Mathematics and Physics, Mälardalen University, SE-721 23 Västerås, Sweden
Pontus Strimling: Department of Mathematics and Physics, Mälardalen University, SE-721 23 Västerås, Sweden
Operations Research, 2007, vol. 55, issue 5, 921-931
In a two-sided version of the famous secretary problem, employers search for a secretary at the same time as secretaries search for an employer. Nobody accepts being put on hold, and nobody is willing to take part in more than N interviews. Preferences are independent, and agents seek to optimize the expected rank of the partner they obtain among the N potential partners. We find that in any subgame perfect equilibrium, the expected rank grows as the square root of N (whereas it tends to a constant in the original secretary problem). We also compute how much agents can gain by cooperation.
Keywords: games/group decisions; strategic secretary problem; dynamic programming/optimal control; optimal stopping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:55:y:2007:i:5:p:921-931
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