Strategic Behavior and Social Optimization in Markovian Vacation Queues

Pengfei Guo () and Refael Hassin ()
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Pengfei Guo: Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Hong Kong
Refael Hassin: Department of Statistics and Operations Research, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel

Operations Research, 2011, vol. 59, issue 4, 986-997

Abstract: We consider a single server queueing system in which service shuts down when there are no customers present and is resumed only when the queue length reaches a given critical length. We analyze the strategic response of customers to this mechanism and compare it to the overall optimal behavior, with and without information on delay. The results are significantly different from those obtained when the server is continuously available. We show that there may exist multiple equilibria in such a system and the optimal arrival rate may be greater or smaller than that of the decentralized equilibrium. Finally, the critical length is taken as a decision variable, and the optimal operations policy is discussed by taking strategic customers into consideration.

Keywords: vacation queue; strategic customers; balking queue; equilibrium analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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