Parameterized Supply Function Bidding: Equilibrium and Efficiency

Ramesh Johari () and John N. Tsitsiklis ()
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Ramesh Johari: Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305
John N. Tsitsiklis: Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

Operations Research, 2011, vol. 59, issue 5, 1079-1089

Abstract: We consider a model where a finite number of producers compete to meet an infinitely divisible but inelastic demand for a product. Each firm is characterized by a production cost that is convex in the output produced, and firms act as profit maximizers. We consider a uniform price market design that uses supply function bidding : firms declare the amount they would supply at any positive price, and a single price is chosen to clear the market. We are interested in evaluating the impact of price-anticipating behavior both on the allocative efficiency of the market and on the prices seen at equilibrium. We show that by restricting the strategy space of the firms to parameterized supply functions, we can provide upper bounds on both the inflation of aggregate cost at the Nash equilibrium relative to the socially optimal level, as well as the markup of the Nash equilibrium price above the competitive level: as long as N > 2 firms are competing, these quantities are both upper bounded by 1 + 1/( N - 2). This result holds even in the presence of asymmetric cost structure across firms. We also discuss several extensions, generalizations, and related issues.

Keywords: supply function equilibrium; resource allocation; efficiency loss (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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