Some Civil Defense Problems in the Nation's Capital Following Widespread Thermonuclear Attack

Richard Bentz, William Chace, Gordon Doerfer, John Donaldson, Thomas English, James Graves, Paul Grim, David Gunlock, Jerome Horowitz, Leland Miller and Albert Small
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Richard Bentz: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Maryland
William Chace: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Maryland
Gordon Doerfer: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Maryland
John Donaldson: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Maryland
Thomas English: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Maryland
James Graves: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Maryland
Paul Grim: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Maryland
David Gunlock: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Maryland
Jerome Horowitz: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Maryland
Leland Miller: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Maryland
Albert Small: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Maryland

Operations Research, 1957, vol. 5, issue 3, 319-350

Abstract: The probable conditions in Washington following widespread thermonuclear attack are assessed with respect to (1) radiation conditions in the city itself and in the surrounding areas, and (2) deaths and debris conditions in the Nation's Capital Mock attacks with thermonuclear-size bombs were made on all targets designated as critical by the FCDA within a 300-mile radius of Washington. Appropriate fallout contours were selected and oriented as to wind speed and bearing for each target. The attacks were repeated 36 times using a random sample of actual 60,000-ft wind readings. Radiation levels for the area were then compiled in terms of the per cent of time a given two-day accumulated dose would be exceeded. An attack day was selected at random and the effects of blast heat and local (close-in) fallout in Washington were added to indirect radiation effects. A comparison of the amount of time a rescue worker would have to wait (impeded by debris and radiation) to enter an area with the amount of time left to a survivor in shelter attenuating 0.9 of radiation effects was made. An area exists, in Virginia, where less than 200 r can be expected a large per cent of the time. A very small percentage of the target population will survive to be cared for in this area. It was found that present shelter is not adequate to prevent intolerable numbers of deaths Present “evacuation areas” should be re-evaluated in terms of likely radiation conditions.

Date: 1957
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