Judge: Don't Vote !

Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki ()
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Rida Laraki: Centre national de la recherché scientifique, Laboratoire d'Analyse et modelisation de Systemes pour l'Aide a la DEcision, Université Paris-Dauphine, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France; and Département d'Economie, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128 Palaiseau Cedex, France

Operations Research, 2014, vol. 62, issue 3, 483-511

Abstract: This article argues that the traditional model of the theory of social choice is not a good model and does not lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing. It presents a more meaningful and realistic model that leads naturally to a method of ranking and electing--- majority judgment ---that better meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method. It gives descriptions of its successful use in several different practical situations and compares it with other methods including Condorcet's, Borda's, first-past-the-post, and approval voting.

Keywords: methods of electing and ranking; Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes; strategic manipulation; faithful representation; meaningful measurement; figure skating; presidential elections; jury decision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1269 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Judge:Don't Vote! (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:62:y:2014:i:3:p:483-511

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