Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities

Itai Ashlagi (), Mark Braverman () and Avinatan Hassidim ()
Additional contact information
Itai Ashlagi: Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142
Mark Braverman: Computer Science, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544
Avinatan Hassidim: Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 52900, Israel

Operations Research, 2014, vol. 62, issue 4, 713-732

Abstract: Labor markets can often be viewed as many-to-one matching markets. It is well known that if complementarities are present in such markets, a stable matching may not exist. We study large random matching markets with couples. We introduce a new matching algorithm and show that if the number of couples grows slower than the size of the market, a stable matching will be found with high probability. If however, the number of couples grows at a linear rate, with constant probability (not depending on the market size), no stable matching exists. Our results explain data from the market for psychology interns.

Keywords: stability; matching; couples; deferred acceptance; market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1276 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:62:y:2014:i:4:p:713-732

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Operations Research from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().