Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?

Athanasia Manou (), Antonis Economou () and Fikri Karaesmen ()
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Athanasia Manou: Department of Mathematics, University of Athens, Panepistemiopolis, Athens 15784, Greece
Antonis Economou: Department of Mathematics, University of Athens, Panepistemiopolis, Athens 15784, Greece
Fikri Karaesmen: Department of Industrial Engineering, Koç University, Sarıyer, Istanbul, 34450, Turkey

Operations Research, 2014, vol. 62, issue 4, 910-925

Abstract: We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves at each visit a random number of customers according to its capacity. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the strategic behavior of the customers and determine their symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies under two levels of information.

Keywords: queueing; strategic customers; transportation station; clearing system; balking; Nash equilibrium strategy; observable model; unobservable model; partial information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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