Combining Spot and Futures Markets: A Hybrid Market Approach to Dynamic Spectrum Access

Lin Gao (), Biying Shou (), Ying-Ju Chen () and Jianwei Huang ()
Additional contact information
Lin Gao: School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Harbin Institute of Technology (Shenzhen), Shenzhen 518055, China; and Department of Management Sciences, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
Biying Shou: Department of Management Sciences, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
Ying-Ju Chen: School of Business and Management and School of Engineering, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Jianwei Huang: Department of Information Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, NT, Hong Kong

Operations Research, 2016, vol. 64, issue 4, 794-821

Abstract: Dynamic spectrum access is a new paradigm of secondary spectrum utilization and sharing. It allows unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to exploit the opportunistically underutilized licensed spectrum. Market mechanism is a widely used promising means to regulate the consuming behaviours of users and, hence, achieve the efficient allocation and consumption of limited resources. In this paper, we propose and study a hybrid secondary spectrum market consisting of both the futures market and the spot market , in which SUs (buyers) purchase underutilized licensed spectrum from a spectrum regulator (SR), either through predefined contracts via the futures market, or through spot transactions via the spot market. We focus on the optimal spectrum allocation among SUs in an exogenous hybrid market that maximizes the secondary spectrum utilization efficiency. The problem is challenging because of the stochasticity and asymmetry of network information. To solve this problem, we first derive an off-line optimal allocation policy that maximizes the ex ante expected spectrum utilization efficiency based on the stochastic distribution of network information. We then propose an online Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction that determines the real-time allocation and pricing of every spectrum based on the realized network information and the prederived off-line policy. We further show that with the spatial frequency reuse, the proposed VCG auction is NP-hard; hence, it is not suitable for online implementation, especially in a large-scale market. To this end, we propose a heuristics approach based on an online VCG-like mechanism with polynomial-time complexity, and further characterize the corresponding performance loss bound analytically. We finally provide extensive numerical results to evaluate the performance of the proposed solutions.

Keywords: secondary spectrum market; dynamic spectrum access; asymmetric network information; game theory; pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1507 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:64:y:2016:i:4:p:794-821

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Operations Research from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().