Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints

Thành Nguyen () and Rakesh Vohra ()
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Thành Nguyen: Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907
Rakesh Vohra: Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

Operations Research, 2019, vol. 67, issue 6, 1503-1519

Abstract: The problem of finding stable matches that meet distributional concerns is usually formulated by imposing side constraints whose “right-hand sides” are absolute numbers specified before the preferences or number of agents on the “proposing” side are known. In many cases, it is more natural to express the relevant constraints as proportions. We treat such constraints as soft but provide ex post guarantees on how well the constraints are satisfied while preserving stability. Our technique requires an extension of Scarf’s lemma, which is of independent interest.

Keywords: stable matching; diversity; Scarf’s lemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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