Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games

Manxi Wu (), Saurabh Amin () and Asuman E. Ozdaglar ()
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Manxi Wu: Institute for Data, Systems, and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Saurabh Amin: Laboratory of Information and Decision Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Asuman E. Ozdaglar: Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

Operations Research, 2021, vol. 69, issue 1, 148-163

Abstract: We study a routing game in an environment with multiple heterogeneous information systems and an uncertain state that affects edge costs of a congested network. Each information system sends a noisy signal about the state to its subscribed traveler population. Travelers make route choices based on their private beliefs about the state and other populations’ signals. The question then arises, “How does the presence of asymmetric and incomplete information affect the travelers’ equilibrium route choices and costs?” We develop a systematic approach to characterize the equilibrium structure and determine the effect of population sizes on the relative value of information (i.e., difference in expected traveler costs) between any two populations. This effect can be evaluated using a population-specific size threshold. One population enjoys a strictly positive value of information in comparison with the other if and only if its size is below the corresponding threshold. We also consider the situation when travelers may choose an information system based on its value and characterize the set of equilibrium adoption rates delineating the sizes of subscribed traveler populations. The resulting routing strategies are such that all travelers face an identical expected cost and no traveler has the incentive to change subscriptions.

Keywords: games; group decisions; nonatomic; transportation; technology; information systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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