School Choice in Chile

José Correa (), Natalie Epstein (), Rafael Epstein (), Juan Escobar (), Ignacio Rios (), Nicolás Aramayo (), Bastián Bahamondes (), Carlos Bonet (), Martin Castillo (), Andres Cristi (), Boris Epstein () and Felipe Subiabre ()
Additional contact information
José Correa: Departamento de Ingenieria Industrial, Universidad de Chile Republica 701, Santiago, Chile
Natalie Epstein: Harvard Business School, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02163
Rafael Epstein: Departamento de Ingenieria Industrial, Universidad de Chile Republica 701, Santiago, Chile
Juan Escobar: Departamento de Ingenieria Industrial, Universidad de Chile Republica 701, Santiago, Chile
Ignacio Rios: Naveen Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080
Nicolás Aramayo: Departamento de Ingenieria Industrial, Universidad de Chile Republica 701, Santiago, Chile
Bastián Bahamondes: Milton Stewart School of Industrial Engineering, Georgia Tech University, Atlanta, Georgia 30332
Carlos Bonet: Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027
Martin Castillo: Department of Politics, New York University, New York, New York 10012
Andres Cristi: Departamento de Ingenieria Industrial, Universidad de Chile Republica 701, Santiago, Chile
Boris Epstein: Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027
Felipe Subiabre: Departamento de Ingenieria Industrial, Universidad de Chile Republica 701, Santiago, Chile

Operations Research, 2022, vol. 70, issue 2, 1066-1087

Abstract: Centralized school admission mechanisms are an attractive way of improving social welfare and fairness in large educational systems. In this paper, we report the design and implementation of the newly established school choice system in Chile, where over 274,000 students applied to more than 6,400 schools. The Chilean system presents unprecedented design challenges that make it unique. First, it is a simultaneous nationwide system, making it one of the largest school choice problems worldwide. Second, the system is used for all school grade levels, from prekindergarten to 12th grade. One of our primary goals is to favor the assignment of siblings to the same school. By adapting the standard notions of stability, we show that a stable assignment may not exist. Hence, we propose a heuristic approach that elicits preferences and breaks ties between students in the same priority group at the family level. In terms of implementation, we adapt the deferred acceptance algorithm as in other systems around the world.

Keywords: Revenue Management and Market Analytics; school choice; matching; two-sided market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:70:y:2022:i:2:p:1066-1087

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