Misinformation and Disinformation in Modern Warfare

Yanling Chang (), Matthew F. Keblis (), Ran Li (), Eleftherios Iakovou () and Chelsea C. White ()
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Yanling Chang: Department of Engineering Technology and Industrial Distribution, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843; Wm Michael Barnes ’64 Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843
Matthew F. Keblis: United States Coast Guard Academy, New London, Connecticut 06320
Ran Li: Sabre Corporation, Southlake, Texas 76092
Eleftherios Iakovou: Department of Engineering Technology and Industrial Distribution, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843; J. Mike Walker ’66 Department of Mechanical Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843; Mosbacher Institute for Trade, Economics, and Public Policy, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843
Chelsea C. White: H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30318

Operations Research, 2022, vol. 70, issue 3, 1577-1597

Abstract: Advanced information technology has changed the landscape of modern warfare, as it facilitates communication among nonconventional actors such as violent extremist groups. This paper examines the value of misinformation and disinformation to a military leader who through investment in people, programs, and technology is able to affect the accuracy of information communicated between other actors. We model the problem as a partially observable stochastic game with three agents, a leader and two followers. We determine the value to the leader of misinformation or disinformation being communicated between two: (i) adversarial and (ii) allied followers. We demonstrate that only under certain conditions, the prevalent intuition that the leader would benefit from less (more) accurate communication between adversarial (allied) followers is valid. We discuss why the intuition may fail and show the necessity of embracing both the reward structures and policies of agents to correctly manage information. Our research identifies efficient targeted investments to affect the accuracy of information in communication to the leader’s advantage. We demonstrate the application of the developed methodology to warfare situations in the Battle of Mosul.

Keywords: Military and Homeland Security; misinformation; disinformation; communication; partially observable stochastic game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:70:y:2022:i:3:p:1577-1597

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