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Allocation with Weak Priorities and General Constraints

Young-San Lin (), Hai Nguyen (), Thành Nguyen () and Kemal Altinkemer ()
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Young-San Lin: Department of Computer Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47906
Hai Nguyen: Department of Computer Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47906
Thành Nguyen: Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47906
Kemal Altinkemer: Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47906

Operations Research, 2022, vol. 70, issue 5, 2804-2819

Abstract: We consider a resource allocation problem that combines three general features: complex resource constraints, weak priority rankings over the agents, and ordinal preferences over bundles of resources. We develop a mechanism based on a new concept called competitive stable equilibrium . It has several attractive properties, commonly captures two different frameworks of one-sided and two-sided markets, and extends them to richer environments. Our framework also allows for an alternative and more flexible tie-breaking rule by giving agents different budgets. We empirically apply our mechanism to reassign season tickets to families in the presence of social distancing. Our simulation results show that our method outperforms existing ones in both efficiency and fairness measures.

Keywords: Market Analytics and Revenue Management; stability; complex constraints; priority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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