The Gatekeeper’s Dilemma: “When Should I Transfer This Customer?”
Brett A. Hathaway (),
Evgeny Kagan () and
Maqbool Dada ()
Additional contact information
Brett A. Hathaway: Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21202
Evgeny Kagan: Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21202
Maqbool Dada: Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21202
Operations Research, 2023, vol. 71, issue 3, 843-859
Abstract:
In many service encounters, frontline workers (often referred to as gatekeepers) have the discretion to attempt to resolve a customer request or to transfer the customer to an expert service provider. Motivated by an incentive redesign at a call center of a midsize U.S.-based bank, we formulate and solve an analytical model of the gatekeeper’s transfer response to different incentive schemes and congestion levels. We then test several model predictions experimentally. Our experiments show that human behavior matches the predictions qualitatively but not always in magnitude. Specifically, transfer rates are disproportionately low in the presence of monetary penalties for transferring even after controlling for the economic (dis)incentive to transfer, suggesting an overreaction to transfer cost. In contrast, the transfer response to congestion information shows no systematic bias. Taken together, these results advance our understanding of cognitive capabilities and rationality limits on human server behavior in queueing systems.
Keywords: Special Issue on Behavioral Queueing Science; decision-making; behavior in queueing systems; service operations; incentive design; gatekeepers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2211 (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:71:y:2023:i:3:p:843-859
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Operations Research from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().