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Some Differential Games of Tactical Interest and the Value of a Supporting Weapon System

Herbert K. Weiss
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Herbert K. Weiss: Aeroneutronic Systems, Inc., Los Angeles, California

Operations Research, 1959, vol. 7, issue 2, 180-196

Abstract: The synthesis of weapon-system complexes often involves consideration of tactical models in which combat extends over a period of time with choices of tactics available to both sides and subject to change with time. This leads naturally to the formulation of the problems as differential games. A tactic that lends itself to analysis is the determination of which of several available targets a weapon should choose. This tactic is incorporated in a combat model that includes a primary and supporting weapon system on each side. Optimum tactics are determined, and the implications on force structure determined depending upon the weapon range, cost, and parametrically specified performance.

Date: 1959
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