Optimum Properties for Defense Strategy of Equal Attack Against All Targets

John E. Walsh
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John E. Walsh: System Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California

Operations Research, 1959, vol. 7, issue 2, 249-255

Abstract: Mathematical models for offense-defense interactions often specify that each member of an offense force receives the same amount of attack from the defense. This equal attack condition is usually motivated by the assumption that the members of the raid are indistinguishable to the defense and randomly arranged in their exposure to attack. This paper shows that the equal attack per raid member procedure has desirable properties when viewed as a deliberate defense strategy. Namely, it is optimum in a game theory sense for an important class of situations even if the defense is considered to have more knowledge about the raid and more attack capabilities than would ordinarily be available. The additional knowledge consists of the ability to segregate the members of the offense force into groups that have the same route, payload, and payload destination. The additional capability consists of the ability to separately attack the members of a group without suffering kill degradation from the presence of the other members of the raid.

Date: 1959
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