A Game-Theory Analysis of Tactical Air War

L. D. Berkovitz and Melvin Dresher
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L. D. Berkovitz: The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California
Melvin Dresher: The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California

Operations Research, 1959, vol. 7, issue 5, 599-620

Abstract: An important problem in tactical air war is concerned with the allocation at each strike of the tactical forces among such competing air tasks as counter-air, air-defense, and support of ground operations. We formulate a two-person multimove game in which the allocation decisions of the combatants represent the moves of the game. In this game model we assume that counter-air missions destroy enemy forces, air-defense missions reduce the enemy's counter-air operations, and support of ground operations contribute to the payoff. We describe the optimal allocations derived from the game-theoretic analysis of this model. The paper concludes with a discussion of possible implications of our results for operational gaming.

Date: 1959
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