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Allocation of Two Types of Aircraft in Tactical Air War: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

L. D. Berkovitz and Melvin Dresher
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L. D. Berkovitz: The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California
Melvin Dresher: The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California

Operations Research, 1960, vol. 8, issue 5, 694-706

Abstract: The problem of allocating two types of aircraft (bombers and fighters) among three different air tasks (counter air, air defense, and support of ground operations) in a multistrike campaign is analyzed as a two-sided war game. It is assumed that a bomber can be used in either the counter-air or ground-support operations, while a fighter can be used in either the air defense or ground support roles. That is, bombers and fighters have one task---ground support---in common. Optimal employment during the last strikes of the campaign consists of a concentration of all resources in support of ground operations. Optimal employment during the early strikes of the campaign requires randomization by both sides.

Date: 1960
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