Dispersal, Deterrence, and Damage

Thomas Schelling

Operations Research, 1961, vol. 9, issue 3, 363-370

Abstract: Dispersal of alert bombers to large-city airfields has been proposed as a way of improving deterrence by increasing the targets that an enemy first strike would have to destroy, without the cost of constructing new bases. It does, however, make urgent targets out of population centers that might otherwise not be attacked. The improvement in deterrence has to be weighted against the greater damage the enemy would be required to inflict in the event he otherwise could not afford, or would not choose, to hit cities. This choice cannot be made without giving quantitative weights to alternative outcomes of war, and evaluating alternative probabilities of successful deterrence. The underlying strategic issue is whether general war, if it occurs, necessarily has to be unlimited, indiscriminate, and exhaustive.

Date: 1961
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