The Future of Arms Control

Thomas Schelling

Operations Research, 1961, vol. 9, issue 5, 722-731

Abstract: Arms control is based on the recognition that military preparations, and even war itself, are nonzero-sum-game activities, with scope for mutually advantageous accommodation even among potential enemies. It is an extension of traditional strategy in the direction of collaboration with potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, the limitation of war if it occurs, or the costs and risks of preparation for war. But the nature of this relation to potential enemies is still only dimly understood, even the character of the arms control that may be the most promising is hard to predict. It is not even clear that, by some measures, the level of armament is necessarily reduced. Although we have had a great deal of passive arms control, we are in a very exploratory stage with respect to explicit military alliances and understandings with potential enemies. It seems almost certain that the kind of strategic analysis that is needed to arrive at good military policy would also be needed to arrive at good arms-control policy.

Date: 1961
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