Relationship Duration and Returns to Brokerage in the Staffing Sector

Matthew Bidwell () and Isabel Fernandez-Mateo ()
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Matthew Bidwell: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
Isabel Fernandez-Mateo: London Business School, Regent's Park, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom

Organization Science, 2010, vol. 21, issue 6, 1141-1158

Abstract: We examine how long-term relationships affect brokers' returns, using project-level pricing data from an information technology staffing firm. We argue that long-term relationships between brokers and their counterparties affect both acquisition of private information and bargaining power, helping brokers to create and capture economic value. The results show that the staffing firm is able to charge a higher price and capture a higher proportion of that price when it has a long-term relationship with the worker. We also show that the staffing firm's ability to generate returns from its relationships is constrained when the brokered parties (worker and client firm) have a long-term relationship with each other. We discuss the implications of these findings for the study of market brokerage and long-term exchange relationships.

Keywords: brokerage; triads; long-term relationships; temporary employment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:21:y:2010:i:6:p:1141-1158

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