Understanding the Role of Worker Interdependence in Team Selection

William P. Millhiser (), Corinne A. Coen () and Daniel Solow ()
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William P. Millhiser: Department of Management, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, The City University of New York, New York, New York 10010
Corinne A. Coen: Organizational Behavior Department, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 44106
Daniel Solow: Department of Operations, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 44106

Organization Science, 2011, vol. 22, issue 3, 772-787

Abstract: In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of policies for assigning interdependent workers to teams. Using a computational simulation, we contrast distributing workers equitably across teams based on prior individual performance with policies that distribute workers based on how well people work together. First, we test a policy that clusters workers into teams by finding natural breakpoints among them where their mutual support is weak. Then we test two other policies that both protect the strongest interdependent core of high performers but differ in that one policy separates workers who give little support to interdependent partners and the other separates workers who receive little support from their partners. All three policies outperform the equitable-distribution approach in some circumstances. We make recommendations to managers for harnessing interdependence when forming teams, whether the managers are familiar or unfamiliar with how well their people work together.

Keywords: design; team design; group performance; group processes; computational simulation; interdependence; organizational complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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